Risk assessment Metric Intelligent agent Model based assessment Monte Carlo method Industrial control system a b s t r a c t We describe a model-based assessment of information and communication technology (ICT) risk that produces statistical samples by simulating the attacks of intelligent agents.
Introduction
Intelligent agents are among the most dangerous threats of information and communication technology, ICT, systems because they escalate their privileges, i.e. access rights, through a sequence of attacks that uses the rights that an attack grants to execute the following ones.
To assess the risk due to these agents we propose a model based approach that collects statistical samples by applying a Monte Carlo method to a scenario where some agents attack the target system of the assessment. The method uses abstract models of an ICT system and of the agents in multiple step-by-step simulations of how each agent selects and executes its attacks. These simulations return a sample to compute the statistics to assess and manage the risk. Our approach does not need to collect historical data because it is model based.
The Haruspex suite is an integrated set of tools to support the proposed approach. These tools build the simulation models, apply the Monte Carlo method, and analyze the samples it returns. We describe how the suite assess two critical ICT systems, each acting as an Industrial Control System, ICS, of a power generation plan. Each assessment determines the probability that some attackers acquire the control of the plan and proposes cost effective countermeasures. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews works on security metrics, vulnerabilities, and attack simulation. Section 3 describes the Haruspex tools to build the models and simulate the agent attacks. After discussing the selection of countermeasures, Section 4, introduces synthetic measures to simplify an assessment. Lastly, it discusses the validation of the suite. Both sections refer to the same running example to simplify the suite description. Section 5 describes the adoption of the suite to assess and manage the ICT risk of two industrial control systems, ICSs, that supervise and manage, respectively, a hydroelectric power generation plant and a thermoelectric one. After briefly resuming the lesson learned in these assessments, we draw some conclusions.
This work integrates the results outlined in [1, 2] and presents them systematically. Furthermore, it applies the suite tools to assess and manage the ICT risk of two ICSs, each supervising a distinct power generation plant. Each assessment considers a scenario where attackers aim to control power generation by acquiring the proper access rights on some ICS components. Each assessment models both insider and external attackers. Lastly, the paper introduces the security stress, a synthetic measure to simplify the communication of the results of an assessment.
Related works
This section reviews previous works on the description and the simulation of attacks against ICT system as well as on metrics of ICT robustness. We also review some works on the impact of ICT risk on power generation and smartgrids. While a large number of works has addressed attack simulation, ICT risk assessment and management, just a few works propose an integrated approach to these issues. This integrated approach is the main original contribution of our work on the Haruspex suite.
Refs. [3] [4] [5] analyze the simulation of attacks against ICT systems. Ref. [6] discuss intelligent, goal oriented agents with reference to terrorism. Ref. [7] describes attack pre conditions and pairs an attack with the proper countermeasure. Ref.
[5] models agents with partial information. These papers do not exploit attack simulation to produce data to assess a system. Furthermore, most tools to analyze privilege escalation do not discover attack sequences. The taxonomy in [8] introduces a classification of vulnerabilities. Ref. [9, 10] discuss the modeling and the selection of countermeasures through attack graphs. Ref. [11] considers goal oriented attackers.
Refs. [12, 13] review security metrics. Ref. [14] [15] [16] propose metrics of the robustness of an ICT system under attack by intelligent agents but they do not integrate these metrics with alternative attacks. The metric in [17] focuses on zero-day vulnerabilities. The one in [18] is similar to security stress as it considers the amount of work to attack a system. Ref. [19] computes the probability that an agent reaches a goal but it neglects alternative attacks for a goal.
Refs. [20] [21] [22] discuss the role and the assessment of ICT risk in power generation and smart grids.
The Haruspex suite: running experiments
For the sake of brevity, we use risk assessment as a synonymous of probabilistic risk assessment while right and privilege are shorthands for access right.
The Haruspex suite supports risk assessment and management of an ICT system with reference a scenario where it is the target of some agents that aim to reach their predefined goals. Some tools of the suite build the models of the target system and of the agents. Other tools use these models to implement independent simulations of the agent attacks. These simulations return a statistical sample with information on, among other, the attacks the agents have executed, the goal they have reached and the time this takes. The resulting approach supports a security-by-design strategy to assess an ICT system during its design and before its deployment.
This section briefly describes the builder and the descriptor, the tools to build the models of, respectively, the system and an agent. Then, it introduces the engine, a tool that applies the Monte Carlo method and simulate the agent attacks. The following section describes the tools of the suite that analyze the samples the engine returns. Table 1 defines some abbreviations and the main parameters of the two models. In the following, we use the system in Fig. 1(a) as a running example to describe the tools and the information they return. vðatÞ the vulnerabilities enabling at preðatÞ the set of rights an agent needs to implement at resðatÞ the resources to execute at postðatÞ the set of rights at grants if it succeeds succðatÞ the success probability of at timeðatÞ the execution time of at kðagÞ the look-ahead of ag
Modeling an ICT system
The builder model decomposes S into components, i.e. hardware/software modules, that define some operations that the users of S and/or the other components invoke. The security policy of S defines the operations each user is entitled to invoke.
The component vulnerabilities enable some attacks [23, 24] . Haruspex supports both effective vulnerabilities, those already known, and potential ones, those that the user suspects. Haruspex pairs each potential vulnerability with the probability the attackers discover it at a given time. To model social engineering attacks, vulnerabilities may affect even the users of S [25] .
The model of S neglects the actions of at and pairs it with the parameters in Table 1 . at is enabled if any vulnerability in vðatÞ is effective and it succeeds with a probability succðatÞ, otherwise it fails.
The builder receives the effective vulnerabilities of S through the output of a vulnerability scanning of each node of S [26] . The assessment can extend the vulnerabilities the scanning return by specifying potential vulnerabilities and/or those of the users.
As an example, to assess the system in Fig. 1 first of all we scan each of its seven nodes to discover its vulnerability. Then, for each node, the assessment can insert further, suspected, vulnerabilities.
The builder maps each vulnerability v into the attacks it enables. To this purpose, it classifies v by matching some predefined patterns against the description of v in the Common Vulnerability Enumeration, CVE, database [23] , a de facto standard [1] . The class of v determines the attributes of each attack at it enables such as succðatÞ and timeðatÞ. The builder signals any vulnerability it cannot classify. Let us suppose that a vulnerability of a component c of a node n enables an attack at that is a buffer overflow [27] . Here, preðatÞ includes the right of invoking the proper function of c. postðatÞ depends upon the role of c. As an example, if c is a component of the OS of n, then postðatÞ may include any right of the administrator of n.
The builder also discovers if at is a remote attack that ag can launch against n from another node. For this reason, one input of the builder is the logical topology of S and the components that control it, e.g. firewalls. The builder assumes that only a node administrator can launch a remote attack. ag exploits remote attacks to acquire some rights on a node n where it is not entitled to any access right. If the logical topology prevents any interaction between n and any node that ag controls, first of all ag has to implement some attacks to become the administrator of a node that can interact with n. From this node, ag may implement remote attacks against n. Assume that Fig. 1(b) shows the logical topology of the system in Fig. 1(a) and that a vulnerability in N 2 enables a remote attack against this node. Even after becoming an administrator of N 1 ; ag cannot implement this remote attack because N 1 cannot directly interact with N 2 . Given the logical topology, only the administrator of N 4 can launch a remote attack against N 2 . If ag only owns some rights on a component on N 1 then it should at first attack and become an administrator of N 4 to launch from this node a remote attack against N 2 .
Modeling agents
An agent ag is a user of S that legally owns some rights on some components of S and aims to illegally reach one or more goals, each a set of rights. No generality is lost by assuming that ag is a user of S because the security policy of S can grant no right to ag. ag reaches a goal after acquiring all its rights and this results in an impact, i.e. a loss the owner of S pays per each unit of time ag owns the rights in g. While the security policy forbids ag to acquire any right in g, there is an impact only if, and when, ag reaches g.
For each agent ag, the user specifies to the descriptor the initial rights, the resource it can access, and the goals. A further parameter we describe in the following is the ranking strategy of ag and its parameters.
ag can implement at only if it owns the resources in resðatÞ. Furthermore, ag also needs the rights in preðatÞ that it may have acquired through previous attacks. Being intelligent, ag selects a sequence of attacks that minimizes the time to reach a goal or maximizes the probability of reaching it. We model this selection as a ranking strategy, or strategy, that depends upon the goals and the preferences of ag, its current rights, the attacks it can implement, and the information on S it has available or it is willing to acquire. ag sequentially executes the attacks in the sequence the strategy returns and it invokes again the strategy after nsðagÞ attacks. ag waits for the discovery of a potential vulnerability when its strategy cannot return a sequence.
kðagÞ, the look ahead of ag, is a parameter of ag that determines the longest sequence the ranking strategy of ag considers. If some sequences with, at most, kðagÞ attacks lead to a goal, then the strategy returns one of these sequences according to the preferences of ag and the attributes of attacks in each sequence. The strategy selects the sequence to execute according to attack attributes only anytime kðagÞ is too low to discover sequences that leads to a goal. Here, the strategy may even return a sequence with useless attacks. at is useless if rights in postðatÞ are useless to reach a goal. If kðagÞ ¼ 0 then ag can only adopt the random strategy that considers any attack ag can implement given its current rights and that increases these rights. The strategy returns with the same probability any attack that satisfies both conditions, even if it is not enabled. Among the other strategies, we recall those used in Section 5:
1. maxProb: returns the sequence with the largest success probability, 2. maxIncr: returns the sequence granting the largest set of rights, 3. maxEff: returns the sequence with the largest ratio between success probability and execution time of attacks.
With reference to our running example, suppose that ag can interact with some components on N 1 and aims to acquire the right of reading a component on N 7 . If kðagÞ ¼ 0 then ag randomly selects one attack against N 1 and repeats it till the attack succeeds. Then, ag selects an attack against N 4 . When controlling N 4 ; ag can launch a remote attack against any of N 2 ; N 3 ; N 5 , and N 6 . There is no guarantee ag attacks a component on N 5 or one on N 6 , the nodes that can interact with N 7 . If kðagÞ ¼ 1, then ag selects one attack according to its success probability or the rights it grants. If kðagÞ ¼ 2; ag ranks sequences with, at most, two attacks. As an example, a sequence may attack N 4 and then N 5 or N 2 . Again, the strategy may favor the joint success probability of the two attacks or the rights they grant. Lastly, if kðagÞ ¼ 3; ag discovers the sequence to attack the component on N 7 and it can avoid useless attacks. In the example, larger values of kðagÞ are meaningful only if ag needs more than one attack to become the administrator of an intermediate node in a path.
The time to reach a goal also includes the one to acquire the information to select a sequence. To model this time, we assume that ag runs a vulnerability scanning of n the first time its strategy ranks a sequence with an attack enabled by a vulnerability of a component executed by n. The scanning takes a time depending upon n. To model insiders, we pair ag with the nodes it does not scan as it already knows their vulnerabilities. ag scans a node only once because the scanning returns any vulnerability in the node components. As an example, if kðagÞ ¼ 2 then ag scans N 1 ; N 2 ; N 3 ; N 4 ; N 5 , and N 6 before selecting its first sequence. If, instead, kðagÞ ¼ 1, then ag will initially scan N 1 . It will scan N 4 only after successfully attacking N 1 . Furthermore, it scans N 2 ; N 3 ; N 5 , and N 6 after successfully attacking N 4 only. Hence, larger values of kðagÞ increase the accuracy of the strategy and avoid useless attacks at the expense of a larger number of scannings before each selection.
Simulation engine
The inputs of the engine include the model of the system and those of the agents in a scenario. The engine applies the Monte Carlo method to implement an experiment with independent runs that simulate, for the same time interval, the agent attacks and the discovery of potential vulnerabilities. In each run, the engine collects the samples to return.
In a time step of a run, the engine considers any idle agent that still has to reach a goal and it applies the ranking strategy of ag. If the strategy cannot return a sequence, then ag is busy for the ranking time only. Otherwise, the engine simulates the first nsðagÞ attacks of the sequence and ag is busy for the ranking time plus the sum of the times of these attacks. ag retries a failed attack for nrðagÞ times and then it invokes again its ranking strategy. nrðagÞ is a further attribute of ag. If ag executes the whole sequence and reaches a goal, the engine updates the corresponding impact.
At the end of a run, the engine inserts into its output database a sample with the sequence of each agent, the goals it has reached and the corresponding time. Then, it initializes the state of S and those of the agents and starts a new run.
An assessment uses the engine output database to compute statistics of interest. The confidence level of these statistics depends upon the number of runs because the engine collects one sample for each run. An experiment ends either after executing the specified number of runs or when a predefined statistic reaches the required confidence level.
It is worth noticing that no tool computes in advance alternative attack sequences of an agent because this result in an intolerable complexity. The suite discovers the sequences an agent executes by simulating its behavior in the runs of an experiment.
Analyzing the output of experiments
This section describes the selection of a cost effective set of countermeasures and then introduces measures to evaluate system robustness. Lastly, it discusses the validation of the overall suite.
Selecting countermeasures
We describe the planner and the manager, the tools that cooperate to select countermeasures.
Discovering the agent plans
The planner analyzes the engine output database to remove useless attacks from the sequences ag has executed to reach g. As previously discussed, ag may select useless attacks because of a low value of kðagÞ. In the running example, if kðagÞ ¼ 1 then ag may reach its goal through a sequence that attacks N 1 ; N 4 ; N 3 ; N 6 and, lastly, N 7 . Obviously, any attack against N 3 is useless. By removing useless attack, we increase cost effectiveness as we only select countermeasures for attacks that contribute to reach g. In the following, we denote as a plan any sequence without useless attacks. The planner maps each sequence s to reach g into a plan pðs; gÞ through a backward scanning of s. The scanning inserts into pðs; gÞ any attack of s that grants rights that belong neither to g nor to the post condition of the current attacks in pðs; gÞ. This algorithm is correct if ag only executes attacks that increase its rights and s does not interleave distinct plans. To solve the latter problem, we also map any permutation of s that is a sequence, e.g. its first j À 1 attacks grants a set of rights that includes the precondition of the j-th one.
To take into account that distinct sequences may implement the same plan, the planner computes the success probability of a plan as the percentage of runs that have successfully implemented it.
Iterative selection countermeasures for a set of plans
In the following, we assume that any attack at has a countermeasure with a finite, known cost that decreases succðatÞ. As an example, the patching of a vulnerability in vulnðatÞ results in the failure of at, while we decrease the probability of discovering passwords or encryption keys by increasing their lengths. We discuss attacks with no countermeasures at the end of the section. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that a scenario includes one agent ag with one goal g. Extensions to more general scenarios are straightforward. The manager receives both the engine output database and lowrisk, the highest success probability of ag the assessment accepts, and it runs a number of iterations. In each iteration:
1. it applies the planner to the output database to discover the agent plans, 2. it selects some plans and determines one countermeasure for each plan, 3. it updates the model of S to mimic the deployment of countermeasures, 4. it runs a new experiment.
The new experiment discovers how ag reacts to the deployed countermeasures, i.e. if ag can select other sequences to replace those affected by the countermeasures. We denote these sequences as dependent ones and their discovery requires a new experiment because agents implement them only after deploying some countermeasures. The manager starts a new iteration as long as the risk due to dependent sequences is larger than lowrisk.
With reference to the system in Fig. 1 , suppose that ag reaches its goal through sequences that attack N 5 while it neglects attacks against N 6 due to their low success probability. However, if attacks against N 5 fail because of some countermeasures, ag can select the attacks against N 6 . The manager runs a new iteration if the resulting risk is larger than lowrisk.
The countermeasures the manager returns are strongly related to the plans it considers at each iteration. In the global approach, the i-th iteration selects countermeasures for all the plans of ag previously discovered, independently of the iteration that discovers a plan. Hence, an iteration may select countermeasures that differ from those previously selected. Instead, in the incremental approach, each iteration extends the countermeasures previously selected with those for the plans discovered in the current experiment.
To compare the two approaches, we recall that the selection of countermeasures for some plans favors the attacks they share to minimize the number of countermeasures. Obviously the global approach exploits shared attacks at best. Instead the incremental one cannot anticipate which attacks the current plans share with the dependent ones the following iterations will discover.
The current version of the manager adopts a global approach where the i-th iteration considers all the plans previously considered and a subset, Cp i , of those discovered in the current iteration. We insert plans into Cp i starting from those with the largest success probability and stop as soon as the overall success probability of the remaining plans is lower than lowrisk. This strategy reduces the computational overhead but it neglects that countermeasures can change the success probability of a plan. The user can bound the size of Cp i as a fixed percentage of the plans discovered in the i-th iteration.
To select countermeasures, the manager maps each attack at in the plans in Sp into SpðatÞ ¼ fi 1 ; . . . ; i k g, the indexes of the plans that share at. A set of countermeasures affects all the plans in Sp if it affects all the attacks in a set Sa that covers Sp, i.e.
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if all the plans in Sp belong to S ðSpðatÞÞ8at 2 Sa. The coverage problem is NP-Complete and the manager analyzes any coverage to determine the optimal one. To reduce the execution time, we abort the building of a coverage as soon as its cost exceeds the current optimum. Furthermore, the manager removes redundant attacks from the plans. at 1 is redundant if all the plans that share at 1 also share a distinct attack at 2 with a cheaper countermeasure. We have experimentally verified that, given the number of plans and the attacks they share, the manager execution time is acceptable provided that SpðatÞ includes at most 100 plans. If agents have available a larger number of plans, then S requires a new, more robust design rather than a more efficient selection of countermeasures.
The manager pairs attacks with no countermeasure with a countermeasure with an infinite cost. If the manager returns a coverage with an infinite cost, at least one plan only includes attacks with no countermeasure. The success probability of this plan is a lower bound on the success probability of ag.
Security measures
We briefly describe some measures to synthesize the analysis of the samples returned by an experiment that adopts the Monte Carlo method.
Metrics based upon countermeasures
A first measure considers the number, or the cost, of countermeasures to reduce the risk to a predefined, user defined, value. Besides simplifying the evaluation of ICT robustness, this metrics also supply information on the weakest components of the target system. These components are those affected by the vulnerabilities targeted by the deployed countermeasures.
Security stress
We define Str S ag;g ðtÞ, the security stress at t due to ag that aims to achieve g, as the cumulative probability distribution that ag reaches g within t.
Str S ag;g ðtÞ is a synthetic measure of the robustness of S that is monotone non decreasing in t and Str S ag;g ð0Þ ¼ 0. To explain its definition, we denote by t 0 the lowest time where Str S ag;g ðtÞ is larger than zero. If t 0 does not exist, Str S ag;g ðtÞ is of no interest because ag cannot successfully attack S. Furthermore, let t 1 be the lowest time, if it exists, where Str S ag;g ðtÞ is 1. If we see the attacks of ag as a force trying to change the shape of S, then this force is ineffective till t 0 when the shape of S begins to change. S cracks after t 1 , the ultimate time, because ag is always successful if t P t 1 . If both t 0 and t 1 exist, t 1 À t 0 evaluates how long S, partially, resists to the force of ag to achieve g. Str S ag;g ðtÞ is the inverse of a survival function [28] as it plots the success probability of ag as a function of t instead than the one that S survives ag attacks. Str S ag;g ðtÞ is a synthetic and accurate evaluation of the robustness of S because several attributes of S and of ag contribute to determine the value of this function. As an example, distinct selections strategies of ag result in distinct stress values due to distinct numbers of useless attacks. Other attributes that influence Str S ag;g ðtÞ includes the length of attack sequences and the success probabilities of attacks.
To generalize Str S ag;g ðtÞ to a set of goal Sg, we assume that ag stops its attacks after reaching any of the goals in Sg. Under this assumption, Str S ag;Sg ðtÞ is the probability that ag is idle after t. To define Str S Sag;g where Sag is a set of agents, we define the most dangerous agent in Sag as the one that results in the largest stress value at any time.
Starting from the engine output database, we approximate Str S ag;g ðtÞ as the percentage of runs that reach g before t. The confidence level of the approximation depends upon the one of the experiment.
A further synthetic measure of robustness is AttS S ag;g ðnÞ, the attack stress. Its definition is similar to the one of security stress but it considers the number of attacks that an agent as available to reach a goal and that includes both successful and failed attacks. AttS S ag;g ðnÞ evaluates in a more detailed way the amount of work of ag to reach g.
Validation of the suite
We have designed and implemented consistency checks to validate the correctness of the suite. However, these checks cannot guarantee that the simulations mimic in a realistic way the behavior of the agents. We have tackled this problem in two steps. The first one has assessed and managed the risk of an ICT system consisting of a set of virtual components with a large number of vulnerabilities. Then, we have produced an improved system that adopts the countermeasures selected by the manager. When white hat attackers have attacked both systems, they have not been able to reach their goals in the improved system. We believe this confirms, at least partially, that our tools simulate in a realistic way intelligent attackers.
Risk assessment and management of two ICSs
This section describes two assessments that have adopted the Haruspex suite. The targets of the assessments are two ICSs that supervise, respectively, a thermoelectric power generation plant and a hydroelectric one. The two assessments show how the availability of data resulting from the simulation of attacks strongly simplifies ICT risk assessment and management to achieve a better level of assurance on the risk due to the target system. This characterizes the Haruspex approach with respect to methodologies that cannot access data on possible attacks against the target system.
Overall structure of the assessments
We have discovered the vulnerabilities in both ICSs through a Nessus vulnerability scan [29] . We have developed some dedicated plug in modules to scans the programmable logical components, PLCs, in both ICSs. PLCs interface the ICS with the industrial plant it has to control. We assume the assessment has no information on the attackers. As a consequence, any experiment covers any combinations of the agent parameters. As an example, there is a distinct agent for each value in the Cartesian product of initial rights, goals and ranking strategies. This does not imply that there is a distinct attackers for each value in the Cartesian product but only that an experiment analyzes each combination to discover the most dangerous agent. An assessment can consider a lower number of agents, e.g. neglect some ranking strategy, provided that further information is available. We neglect values of k larger than 2 after experimentally verifying they are not effective. Each experiment consists of 60.000 runs. This results in a 95% confidence level on the components an agent attacks to reach a goal. The time limit of each run is three days or 72 h because both ICSs can detect the attacks after this limit. To simplify the presentation, for each assessment we only discuss the security and the attack stresses due to the agents of interest. In both assessments, a countermeasure for an attack patches one of its enabling vulnerabilities.
Thermoelectric ICS: risk assessment and management
After briefly describing this ICS, we discuss its assessment and the management of the corresponding risk.
Structure of the ICS
This experimental ICS consists of three subnets: the intranet network, the process network and the control one. Each subnet is flat as any two of its nodes can interact. A switch and some firewalls define the perimeters of each subnet and filter communications to/from subnets. This ICS adopts a defense in depth strategy where only the nodes in the process network can connect to those in the control one. For the same reason, intranetnodes can only interact with those in the process one. The six nodes in the intranet network interface the nodes in the generation plant to nodes in the control network. The main nodes are a Windows Domain Server and two VPN Clients that remotely access the process network. The 17 nodes in the process network run SCADA servers and clients that supervise and control power generation. Through these nodes, the operators can control the whole production plant. Some nodes are redundant for safety reasons. Lastly, the 7 nodes in the control network simulate the power generation plant through hydraulic circuits and two PLCs. Any agent aims to control the PLCs to control of a subset of the plant.
More than 2700 vulnerabilities affect the ICS nodes and they enable 1900 attacks. We have manually verified that agent can implement more than 700 attack sequences. The Windows Domain Server is the intranet node with the largest number of vulnerabilities, 61. The process network node with the largest number of local vulnerabilities, 634, is the ASC server. Finally, the PLCs are the control network nodes with the largest number of vulnerabilities, 10.
The builder has not classified three vulnerabilities only. We have manually verified the correctness of the classification.
Agents in the scenario
As previously discussed, the agents in each experiment cover four ranking strategies and, where appropriate, two k values, 1 and 2. We define now the other parameters that characterize an agent: the goal and the initial rights. An o À agent aims to control at least one PLC while a b À agent aims to control both PLCs. Furthermore, initially an insider agent controls a process network node, while an external attacker controls an intranet node. To cover all the combinations, each experiment simulates the attack of 28 distinct agents.
Output of the assessment
The most dangerous insider; o À agents adopt the MaxProb and MaxIncr strategies with k ¼ 2. After 1 h and 50 min, they reach their goal with a probability equal to 0.75. The probability is 1 after 3 h. The attack stress is 0.75 after 3 attacks and it is 1 after 8 attacks. The least dangerous o À agent adopts the random strategy. The security stress becomes positive after 7 h and 45 min and it reaches 1 after more than 20hours. The attack stress is positive after 12 attacks and becomes 1 after 36 attacks.
The most dangerous o À agent adopts MaxIncr with k ¼ 2. This agent reaches a 0.7 success probability after 1 h and 50 min and it is always successful after 4 h. The agent reaches these probability values after, respectively, 3 and 8 attacks. The agent that adopts the MaxProb strategy with k ¼ 2 results in a lower security stress but similar to this one. The agents with the worst performances adopt, respectively, the MaxIncr strategy with k ¼ 1 and the random one that have a non-zero success probability after, respectively, 12 h and 45 min and 4 h. Both agents are always successful after 24 h. The attack stress of a MaxIncr; k ¼ 1 agent is positive after 21 attacks and it reaches 1 after 41 attacks. The two corresponding values for the random agent are 5 and 41.
The most dangerous insider b À agent adopts the maxIncr strategy with k ¼ 2. It controls both PLCs after 2 h and 25 min or 2 attacks with a 0.65 probability and it is always successful after 5 h and 30 min or 9 attacks. The worst strategy is the random one and an insider b À agent that adopts it reaches its goal after more than 23 h and 30 attacks. With reference to the maxIncr strategy, an increase of k from 1 to 2 reduces the time to a goal of more than 60% and the number of attacks of about 75%.
The most dangerous external b À agent adopts the maxIncr strategy with k ¼ 2. The agent control both PLCs after 2 h and 25 min or 3 attacks with a 0.65 probability and it is always successful after 6 h and 30 min or 16 attacks. Even for external b À agent, the worst ranking strategy is the random one that results in a 300% increase in the number of attacks and in a similar increase in the time to a goal. If the agent adopts the maxIncr strategy, an increase of k from 1 to 2 halves the number of attacks and results in a 60% reduction in the time to a goal.
Figs. 2-5 show some stress curves computed through these experiments.
Countermeasures
In just one iteration, the manager computes a set with 10 countermeasures that affect 309 plans and patch any vulnerability in the nodes that connect the process network and control one. By patching less than 1% of the ICS vulnerabilities, we stop all the plans.
Hydroelectric ICS: risk assessment and management

Structure of the ICS
This ICS, see Fig. 6 , consists of seven subnets: the intranet network, the central network, the antivirus network, the DMZ network, the PLC network, and two process networks, PCN 1 and PCN 2 . Three firewalls, fw m ; fw pt and fw agp route and filter the communications among the networks.
fw m interconnects the intranet, the central and the antivirus networks and route messages among these networks. The intranet acts as a bridge that securely connects the SCADA operators and the process network. The central network has 12 nodes, one of them runs 5 virtual machines that we consider as further network nodes. Operators manage power generation through SCADA clients and workstations in this network. The antivirus network consists of one server to update the virus definitions in the overall ICS.
fw pt interfaces the DMZ and the PCN 1 networks. The DMZ network consists of two Web Servers that collect statistical information on the processes involving the SCADA components. The PCN 1 network consists of 5 servers, one is a Domain Controller and two are SCADA servers to manage power generation.
fw agp interfaces the PCN 2 network that includes a SCADA Server with two network interfaces connected to, respectively, the PCN 2 network and the PLC network. The latter includes some PLCs that manage hydroelectric power production.
The vulnerabilities returned by the scanning of all the nodes, including the PLCs, enable 764 attacks. 
Agents in the scenario
Also in this assessment, the agents in an experiment cover all possible combinations of agent parameters. However, in this ICS any two PLCs are equivalent and all the agents aim to control any PLC. Hence, any experiment considers 14 agents only. Any external attacker initially controls a node in the intranet network. Instead, each insider initially control a node in the PCN 1 network.
Security and attack stress
Even in this ICS, the most dangerous insider adopts the maxIncr ranking strategy with k ¼ 2. Its security stress is positive after 2 h and 30 min and it is 1 after 11 h and 15 min. The worst ranking strategy is maxIncr with k ¼ 1. The security stress of this agent is 0.8 after 72 h. The attack stress reaches the same value after 99 attacks.
The most dangerous external agent adopts a maxIncr; k ¼ 2 strategy and its stress is 1 after at least 12 h or 23 attacks. The least dangerous external agent adopts maxIncr and k ¼ 1. Its stress is 0.8 after 72 h or 99 attacks.
It is worth noticing that this is the only assessment we have run till now where the random strategy is not the worst one. It is also the first one where an agent stress does not reach 1 in a run.
Figs. 7 and 8 show some stress curves for this ICS. 
Countermeasures
The agents execute 9 distinct plans that we can stop by patching the same vulnerability in each PLC component. If we neglect this, trivial, countermeasure, the manager determines in two iterations a set of 7 vulnerabilities to patch. The first iteration discovers 7 plans and returns a set with 7 vulnerabilities to patch. The second iteration discovers 2 further, dependent, plans and it selects a distinct set that also includes 7 vulnerabilities shared among the 9 plans. The third experiment does not discover further dependent plans. This shows how a global approach minimizes the number of countermeasure because the second iteration can select distinct countermeasures for the same plans. Instead, in an incremental approach each iteration can only extend the countermeasures previously selected.
Lessons learned
The differences between the two ICSs strongly influence the complexities of the two assessments. In fact, one ICS is an experimental, built and developed to investigate security issues while the other ICS controls a real plant. The complexity of a real ICS has influenced the time to build the system and the agent models and the one to run the experiments. The time to build the system model has doubled, from less than a day to a couple of days. The time to run each experiment increases from less than one hour to a few hours. This is due to the confidence level we require, 95% on the components that an agent attacks. Because of the complexity of a real system, this level strongly increases the number of runs in the experiments. However, Haruspex strongly reduces the time to assess and manage ICT risk with respect to traditional assessments. We have also verified that a much lower number of runs results in the same confidence level on the success probability of each agent. The stress functions of the two ICSs confirm that the adoption of a larger number of subnets and of firewalls strongly increases the overall robustness. A further, expected, result is the influence of the agent parameters. All the scenarios considers more agents than those strictly required to recover the lack of information on the agents parameters. The availability of the large amount of data produced by attack simulation simplifies the assessment but has suggested the adoption of a synthetic measure, the security stress, to simplify results presentation. It also worth noticing the similarities between the outputs of the assessment of an ICS and those of other ICT systems with high security requirements. As an example, even in ICSs a low number of countermeasures suffices to guarantee that the attacker cannot reach their goal.
Conclusion
The Haruspex suite is an integrated set of tools to assess and manage ICT risk through multiple simulations of intelligent, goal oriented agents. These agents escalate their access rights by composing attacks enabled by the target system vulnerabilities. Lack of information on the threat agents may recovered by considering a set of agents, one for each distinct combinations of the parameters that determine the agent behavior. The adoption of the Haruspex suite enables the system architect to discover weakness and the proper countermeasures in the design phase before deploying the system. We have (2015) xxx-xxxapplied the suite to two ICSs that supervise power generation in a scenario where some attackers aim to control the generation plant. This results in the discovery of the most dangerous attackers, the probability they reach their goals and the time this takes. Both assessments have improved the overall resilience of ICT components and, hence, of the whole plant by selecting a small set of countermeasures that prevents an attacker from controlling power generation.
Future developments of our work concern the development of tools to model a larger class of threat agents, in particular those that heavily exploit malware or worms. These agents aim control a large number of nodes to launch further attacks. An even more challenging development concerns the ability of managing a larger number of countermeasures such as those that update the system topology. These countermeasures dynamically update the overall system structure and this has a deep impact on the system models and, hence, on attack simulation. However, these developments are fundamental to apply the suite to highly complex systems such as smartgrids.
